An Entirely Different Way of Waging War. Quebec, 1777.

It is well-known that General John Burgoyne’s army faced quite a few difficulties as it was making its way south toward New York in the summer and fall of 1777. These challenges included rough terrain and unfavorable weather, a shortage of supplies and provisions, weaker than expected local support, and poor, or completely absent, communication with General William Howe in New York and Lord Germain in London. With the advantage of hindsight, it seems unsurprising that the campaign ended in disaster for the British. However, despite early signs that this would be a trying expedition, it started promising, and its commanders remained confident that it would end triumphantly.  

At the very outset of the campaign, Major General Friedrich Adolph Riedesel, the commander of the Braunschweig troops, acknowledged some of the army’s difficulties in a letter to his sovereign, the Hereditary Prince of Braunschweig. It is dated June 1, when Riedesel was at Trois-Rivières, and Burgoyne was in Montreal.

Image: William Faden, A map of the inhabited part of Canada from the French surveys : with the frontiers of New York and New England from the large survey by Claude Joseph Sauthier (1777) [Detail]. Accessed at Boston Public Library Norman B. Leventhal Map & Education Center.

Riedesel appears to be addressing concerns regarding the condition of the corps that were raised in letters from his sovereign. While he alludes to certain difficulties, he blames them on circumstances beyond his control, including “the entirely different way of waging war here compared to how war is conducted in Europe and at home in Germany.” He rejects responsibility for any “mistakes” that may have occurred, assuring his ruler that he was carrying out “his duty with the greatest zeal and best intentions.”  

Moreover, contrary to what his ruler may have believed, Riedesel does not attribute the army’s challenges to the rebels’ “bravery or firmness.” Instead, he lists poor military leadership, the extremely challenging terrain, and the difficulties with supplying the army from England as the main reasons for the campaign’s slow progress. He also shares some of his own criticism regarding British military strategy. Yet despite these concerns, Riedesel expresses confidence that the royal army was in far better shape than the rebel forces. He is also convinced that a growing number of Americans were beginning to realize that they had been misled by “ambitious spirits” who had “deceived them under the guise of an idealistic freedom.” Ultimately, Riedesel remains optimistic that the campaign would end successfully, and that the war could then be brought to a swift conclusion.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Trois-Rivières, June 1, 1777

Most Serene Hereditary Prince, Most Gracious Prince and Lord,

At last, I have been happy to receive, within a period of 10 days, three letters from His Serene Highness: one dated September 14, one from October 8, and the last from the month of January of this year. I cannot describe the great joy I felt because of them, and I express my most humble thanks for the gracious remembrance, which is more precious to me than anything in the world.

My orders concerning discipline, as well as all possible arrangements I made to ensure the proper observance of economy within the regiments, and the punishments wherever I found these orders to have been disobeyed; [as well as] the testimony of our officers as well as that of all foreign officers regarding the great efforts I have made to observe the Serene Highness’s instructions precisely and to protect His interests in the best possible way, will hopefully always serve to legitimize me, in that I have fulfilled my duty with the greatest zeal and best intentions. And should any mistakes have occurred here and there against the Serene Highness’s intentions, as it is to be feared from certain received princely replies, it was not due to me and even less due to the orders issued or the strict discipline enforced, but rather due to the necessities we received before our departure, the composition of the troops we received, and the entirely different way of waging war here compared to how war is conducted in Europe and at home in Germany. His Serene Highness is too gracious to affirm in His gracious letter of September 14, how one relies on my zeal and diligence to maintain the corps in a tolerable condition, even though much remains to be desired regarding its internal state. This is indeed the case: the corps is in quite good condition; necessaries [kleine Mondierung], weapons, and field equipment are in as good order as is possible; we provide for everything ourselves out of our own funds, and not the slightest expense falls upon His Serene Highness. I had flattered myself that this would win me the satisfaction of His Serene Highness, about which I have now come somewhat into doubt due to the replies received. Not a single word of all the wise advice that His Serene Highness gave me during our many pleasant conversations has been lost to me. I have sought to put all of it into practice and therefore believed even more strongly that I succeeded in my conduct.  

As the best connoisseur of our profession, His Serene Highness quite accurately understands our situation. However, it is certainly not the bravery or firmness of the rebels that is to blame for the fact that matters remain undecided. Rather, it is the disharmony among the army chiefs, the slow dispatch of supplies from England, the difficult situation, and the indescribable hindrances posed by the terrain that are the reasons everything is progressing so slowly. Is it really permissible that an army remains in winter quarters until the 31st of May? That the provisions upon which an army is supposed to live during a campaign only begin to arrive in mid-June? The slightest advantages we have over the enemy, we scorn at it, and yet we do not benefit from these advantages. Has anyone ever seen three battalions detached 20 hours ahead of the army without support? The smallest setback strikes us down so completely that, lacking Framontane [?] we do not know what we are supposed to do.

Our army is now on the move, and I hope that it will be assembled at Crown Point by the 15th of this month. After that, it will depend on what we are to do with Carillon [Fort Ticonderoga]. If we succeed this year in establishing communication with General Howe, we will occupy Boston and the harbors in the northern part of America, and General Howe will occupy Pennsylvania, then the greatest portion, then the greatest portion [sic] of the provinces will have been acquired, and all that remains is the acquisition of Carolina and Virginia.

Although it is true that men are becoming scarce in the royal army, we will still be less likely to lack provisions than the rebels, since we can obtain them in abundance from England.

The situation of the rebels, however, is very different. They have no money, and their paper money has no value anymore. Agriculture has come to a standstill because the men are needed for the army. The subjects, who must give up everything to supply the army, are complaining and discontented. Their army is growing weaker every day due to deserters. Meanwhile, the royal army is becoming stronger through the new militia battalions, six of which have already been raised (but are being paid in the same way as the English infantry). Horses and oxen in the countryside are either dead or ruined. Within a year, they will lack in everything, and the common people are now beginning to realize that they are the victims of ambitious spirits who have deceived them under the guise of an idealistic freedom.

I hope that my next report will be more interesting. I humbly attach the continuation of the journal and remain, in deepest devotion Your Serene Highness’s most humble servant Riedesel

TRANSCRIPTION

Trois Riviere [Trois-Rivières] den 1ten Juny 1777.

Durchlauchtigster Erb Printz gnädigster Fürst und Herr

Endlich bin ich glücklich gewesen in Zeit von 10 Tagen Drey Briefe von Erw: Hochfürstl Durchl: zu erhalten, einen vom 14ten Septb. Einen vom 8ten October und den lezten vom Monath January dieses Jahres, ich kann nicht beschreiben die grose Freude, die Ich darüber gehabt habe, und statte meinen Unterthänigsten Dank ab, vor das gnädigste Andenken, welches mir schätzbahrer als alles in der Welt ist.

Meiner wegen disciplin gegebene Ordres, als auch alle mögliche Arrangements, so ich zur beobachten aller in den Regimentern zu haltenden Oeco[no]mie gegeben und gemacht habe, und die ausgeübte Straffen wo ich gefunden habe, daß darwieder gehandelt worden. Das Zeugnuß Unserer Officiers so wohl als von allen fremden Officiers, wegen der vielen Mühe so ich mir gegeben, die Hochfürstl: Instructions genau zu beobachten, und dero Interesse bestens zu wahren, werden hoffentlich mich jederzeit Legitimiren, daß ich meine Schuldigkeit mit dem grösten Eyfer und besten Willen beobachtet habe, und solten hier und da fehler gegen die Hochfürstl: Intentions vorgefallen sein, wie es aus einigen erhaltenen Hochfürstl: Rescriptions [Antworten] zu fürchten ist, so hat es weder an mir gelegen noch weniger an den zu gebenden Ordres, und strengen Disciplin, sondern an die vor Unseren Ausmarsch erhaltenen desideriis [Bedürfnisse], and der Consistentz der erhalten Truppen, und der gantz verschiedenen Art hier Krieg zu führen, mit der wie man in Europa, und bey uns in Teutschland Krieg zu führen. Erw: Hochfürstl: Durchl: sind zu gnädig, daß Sie mir in dero gnädigen Schreiben vom 14. Sept: zu versicheren, wie man sich auf meinen Eyfer und Fleiß verliese, daß ich das Corps auf einen leidlichen Fuß unter halten würde, an deßen inneren Zustand vielles zu desideriren [wünschen] übrig bleibe. Dieses geschieht auch gewiß, das Corps ist in rechten guten Zustand, kleine Mundirung Armatur und Feldgeräthschaft so gut wie immer möglich in Ordnung, wir helfen uns in allen Stücken aus Unseren eigenen Cassen, und nicht die geringste Depence komt Serinissimo zur Last, Ich hatte mir flattirt, daß dieses mir die Zufriedenheit Serinissimi würde zu wege bringen, worüber Ich in etwas durch die erhaltene Rescripten in Zweifel gerathen bin. Kein Wort von allen den guten Rath den mir Erw: Hochfürstl: Durchl: in denen öfteren Mündlichen so angenehmen Unterhaltungen, gegeben haben, ist bey mir verlohren gegangen, ich habe Sie gesucht alle in Execution zu bringen, um desto mehr gedacht, ich in meinen Conduite renssirt [Erfolg gehabt] zu haben.

Erw: Hochfürstl: Durchl: als bester Kenner Unsers Metier schließen gantz recht von Unser Situation, aber Sicher nicht die Bravour noch fermetaet [Fermetät Festigkeit, Kraft] der Rebelles ist Schuld daran, daß die Sachen noch nicht determiniert sind, Disharmonie der Chefs der Armeen, langsame Speditionen der desiderin [Bedürnisse] aus Engelland, difficile Laage, und unbeschreibliche Hinder nüße des Terrains, sind die Ursachen daß alles so langsam gehet, ist es wohl erlaubt daß eine Armee biß den 31ten May in den Winter quartieren lieget, daß die Vivres wovon eine Armee in der Campagne leben soll, erstlich medio [Mitte des Monats] Juny anlangt. Die geringste Avantagen so wir über den Feind haben, verachten wir denselben, ohngeachtet wir doch nicht von den Avantagen profitiren, hat man jehmahls 3 Batallions ohne soutien [Soutièn Unterstützung] 20 Stunde vor die Armee detachiren sehen. Der geringste Echec [Versagen] schlägt uns so nieder, daß aus Mangel vor Framontane [?] nicht wißen waß wir thun sollen.

Unsere Armee ist nun in Bewegung, und hoffe ich daß solche den 15ten huy: zu Crown Point wird ressemblirt sein, als dann wird es ankommen, waß wir mit Carillion [Fort Ticonderoga] machen werden. Gewinnen wir dieses Jahr die Communication mit dem General How [Howe], occupiren wir Unserer Seits Boston und die Hafens des nördlichen Theil von America, und der General How [Howe] occupiert Bensilvanien, so ist der gröste Theil, so ist der gröste Theil [sic] von den Provinzen aquirirt, und bleibt als denn nur noch übrig die aquisition von Carolina und Virginien.

Es ist zwar wahr daß die Menschen bey der königlichen Armee rar werden, so wird es Uns doch an Lebens Mittel jederzeit weniger fehlen, wie denen Rebellen, weil wir solche in Uberfluß aus England bekommen können.

Die Situation der rebellen ist aber weit verschiedener Sie haben kein Geld, und das papierne Geld hat keinen Valeur mehr, der Acker Bau liegt still, weil die Manschaft bey der Armee gebraucht wird, der Unterthan, der alles zur verpflegung der Armee hergeben muß, klaget ist mißmuthig, Ihre Armee wird durch die Außreiser täglich schwächer, die königliche Armee wird durch die neue Militz Batallions, derer uns schon 6 aufgerichtet sind | : und welche aber so, wie die Englische Infanterie bezahlt wird : | immer stärcker, Pferde und Ochsen auf den platten Land sind theils tod theils ruinirt, mit hin in einen Jahr wird es Ihnen an allen fehlen, und der Gemeine Mann fängt nun schon an einzusehen, daß er das Opfer ambitieusen Geister ist, die sie unter dem Schatten einer Idealischen Freyheit betrogen haben.

Ich hoffe daß mein nächster Rapport interessanter sein soll, ich füge die Continuation des Journals in  Unterthänigkeit mit bey, und ersterbe in tiefster devotion Erw: Hochfürstl: Durchl: Unterthänigster Knecht Riedesel

Citation: Letter is included in: “Americanische Briefe des Herrn Erbprintz Durchlaucht …,” WO 38b alt Nr. 236, ff. 89-91, Lower Saxony State Archives Wolfenbüttel.

Featured Image: [F. F. Heerwagen], Plan von Fort Crown-Point und Umgebung am Lake Champlaine, 1777, HStAM WHK 28/38, Hessian State Archive Marburg.

2 thoughts on “An Entirely Different Way of Waging War. Quebec, 1777.

  1. Of the German soldiers who adapted best to America were the jaegers. Their rifles, tactics, ability to move, and good leadership (I’m thinking particularly of Captain Ewald) made them very valuable. They were the German equivalent of Morgan’s Pennsylvania riflemen.

    Both sides tried to adapt to the other’s tactics. Von Steuben drilled American soldiers to fight like Europeans. Light infantry and jaegers were in some ways also like Native Americans, using cover and concealment to accomplish their mission.

    Impediments for Germans: lack of English language skills, cultural differences between Germans and English, first time serving a long way away from Germany, looked down upon by the British, differences in tactics-strategies.. If the British needed the Germans so much, they surely didn’t have good skills in how to work together.

    Captain Georg Paeusch also drew a map of Crown Point. German drawings and maps are among the best from the war. They were trained in Cassel.

    Without the drawings of Lt J M Bach and other Hessian officers, we would not know much about Hesse-Hanau(HH) and Hesse-Cassel (HC) artillery. Many served in both HH and HC artillery.

    Recently at Breyman’s Redout at the Saratoga Battlefield, Hesse-Hanau artillery was in action until toops beside them left the battlefield exposing their position. A great drawing by Don Troiani shows this and the valuable contribution of the 100+ German women and children camp followers.

    Robert Moeller Johannes Schwalm Historical Association and Hersfelder Geschichtsverein member.

    On Sun, Jun 15, 2025 at 12:17 PM Hessians – German Soldiers in the American

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