Over the course of the war, the German territories supplied their troops in North America with clothing (including uniforms), small arms, medical equipment, and similar articles. Procuring and shipping these items across the Atlantic was a complicated and expensive undertaking. It was not unusual for shipments to arrive at their intended destination after lengthy delays or not at all. In addition, the articles that were sent to the troops in America were not always of the best quality.

We know about these challenges primarily from correspondence between commanding officers in North America and government officials in their home territories. For example, the papers of General Riedesel of the Braunschweig corps include quite a few complaints about the shortage of urgently needed supplies. The item included with this post deals with a complaint about another issue: the incompatibility of (German) arms and (British) ammunition.

Friedrich Adolph Riedesel Freiherr zu Eisenbach (1738-1800), in contemporary records typically identified as Adolph von Riedesel, was the commander of the corps that was hired out by the Duke of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel to King George III in his war against the American rebels. Along with the first division of Braunschweigers, he arrived in Quebec, Canada, in June 1776. The following year, he participated in General Burgoyne’s ill-fated campaign into New York. As a result of Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga in October 1777, Riedesel became an American prisoner of war. In 1779, he received permission to travel to New York to be exchanged. It was not until 1781, after spending around two years in New York, that he was able to return to Canada. On September 10, 1781, he announced his arrival to the troops in Canada in a letter, “after an absence of four years – a period spent in misery, chagrin and all possible discomfort.”

Imagine Riedesel’s disappointment and frustration when he discovered that a long-awaited shipment of muskets from Braunschweig was of little use: they were not compatible with cartridges that had been supplied by Britain. Riedesel reported the issue to his ruler in the spring of 1781.

Included with this post is not Riedesel’s complaint. Instead, I am featuring the official response from the Braunschweig Master of Arms, Captain Johann Carl Friedrich Bethge, dated May 1782. It was the final word in a protracted exchange of letters and reports that had commenced almost a year earlier.

Based on Bethge’s response, it is hard to avoid the impression that officials in Braunschweig were not especially concerned with equipping the troops with serviceable weapons. Of course, by May 1782, even Riedesel (back in Canada) had come to the realization that his corps would not participate in another campaign in North America. Still, he must have been irritated by Bethge’s explanation why these muskets were sent in the first place, and why they would most likely not be needed anyway.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Copy of the original that was sent to General Major von Riedesel on March 16, 1782.

Based on the report by General Major von Riedesel, dated Fort George on Long Island, May 9, 1781, concerning the examination of the compatibility of the muskets with the cartridges that were received from Portsmouth, it is to be concluded: that the eight muskets that were used by the four companies, and of which supposedly only two muskets could accommodate the cartridges, were not among the muskets that Captain Weiss brought over in 1780. Rather, they had been taken [by the troops] from Braunschweig or they had been sent to them prior to 1780. If this is the case, then the fault is not with the muskets but with the cartridges, and the English caliber must necessarily be larger than ours. Because as different as the dispatched muskets are regarding the locks and fittings, their barrels are certainly consistent with our caliber, and the entire musket had previously been put into the most useful state at the armory in terms of the locks.

However, if the cartridges that were received from Portsmouth were tried out with the 137 muskets with their fittings that Captain Weiss brought with him in 1780, then I have to admit that these 137 muskets are slightly smaller calibers than our usual infantry musket, and therefore, the English infantry cartridges may well be somewhat larger than their caliber. The following considerations were the reason why they were nevertheless dispatched:

1. Because these muskets are almost as good as new and are completely flawless in terms of usability.
2. Because His Highness had already designated this type of musket on account of its quality for the Battalion von Barner at its departure [from Wolfenbüttel].
3. With regard to the ammunition, it was to be assumed that, if initially a company and eventually an entire regiment would be provided with these 137 muskets, this would not cause any problems at all, because the dragoon regiment carries the same caliber if not something smaller, and therefore they have to be provided with cartridges from there.

However, if the latter should not take place, and also if there were not so many sick and vacancies in the regiment that these 137 muskets with their fittings could be viewed as a reserve, it is nevertheless certain that the General Major v. Riedesel must be relieved of any difficulties, because in 1781, another 260 muskets of regular caliber were sent to America with Captain Rabe. In the lists with required arms and field equipment that the aforementioned General Major von Riedesel sent for the year 1782, not a single musket was demanded. On the contrary, it was expressly stated: “After deducting those items which had already been brought here by Captain Rabe in 1781.” Hence, it can be concluded that the 260 muskets sent there in 1781 must be a surplus, so even if the 137 muskets with iron fittings could not be used in any way, the resulting disadvantage can be completely remedied by this surplus of 260 muskets.

Braunschweig, March 15, 1782, [Captain and Master of Arms] Johann Carl Friedrich Bethge

TRANSCRIPTION

Copia wovon das Original, dem Gen. Maj. v Riedesel unterm 16. Mart. 1782 zugefertigt ist

Aus den mir gnädigst zugestellten Protocoll des General Major v. Riedesel, Actum Fort George auf Long Island, den 9ten May 1781. die Untersuchung des Calibers der Gewehre gegen die aus Portsmouth empfangenen Patronen betr: ist zu schliessen, daß die von denen darin aufgeführten 4. Compagnien zu dieser Untersuchung producirten 8. Stück Gewehre, worunter nur 2. Stück Gewehre seyn sollen, darin die Patronen gepasst, nicht von denen Gewehren seyn müssen, welche der Hauptmann Weiss in ad 1780. uberbracht, sondern bereits mit aus dem Lande genommen haben, oder aber vor ad 1780. von hier nachgeschickt worden sind. Verhält sich die Sache so, wie voraus gesetzet worden, so liegt die Schuld nicht an den Gewehren sondern an den Patronen und das Englische Caliber der Gewehre muß nothwendig stärker seyn als das unsrige: denn so verschieden auch die abgeschickten Gewehre in Ansehung der Schlosse und Garnituren gewesen sind, so sind die Läufe dennoch gewiß mit dem unsrigen Caliber mässig, und das ganze Gewehr in Ansehung der Schlosse bey dem Zeughaus zuvor in den brauchbarsten Stand gesetzet worden.

Sind aber die aus Portsmouth erhaltenen Patronen, nach denen in ad 1780. von dem Hauptmann Weiss mitgebrachten 137. Stück Gewehre mit ihren Beschlag probiert werden, so muß ich eingestehen, daß diese 137. Stück etwas kleinere Caliben als unsere gewöhnliche Infanterie Gewehr sind, und dahero gar wol die Englischen Infantrie-Patronen etwas stärker als ihr Caliber seyn können: allein folgende Bewegungs=Gründe sind Ursache gewesen, daß solche dennoch sind weggeschicket worden 

1. Weil diese Gewehre fast noch so gut wie neu und in Ansehung der Brauchbarkeit ganz ohne Tadel sind. 
2. Weil Ser^mus bereits schon bey den Ausmarsch dieser Art Gewehre in Ansehung ihrer Güte für das Bataillon v. Barner gnädig bestimmt hatten 
3. In Ansehung der Munition war zu vermuthen, daß wenn mit diesen 137. Stück Gewehren vorerst eine Compagnie und nachgehens successivement ein ganzes Regiment versehen würde, solches gar keine Verlegenheit verursachen können, weil das Dragoner-Regiment gleiches wo nicht etwas schwächeres Caliber führet, und demnach von dort aus mit Patronen versehen werden muß. 

Sollte dieses letzterer aber auf keine Weise statt finden, auch nicht bey die Regimenter so viele Kraanke und Vacante vorhanden seyn, daß diese 137. Stück Gewehr mit ihren Beschlag als ein Vorrath anzusehen wären, so ist demnach gewiß 

Daß der General Major v. Riedesel nothwendig aus aller Verlegenheit muß gerissen seyn, weil in ad 1781 durch den Hauptmann Rabe abermals 260. Stück Gewehr von ordinariren Caliber nach America geschickt worden sind, in denen von erwehnten General Major v Riedesel eingeschickten Listen aber was für Armatur-Stücke und Feld Requisiten auf das Jahr 1782 dorthin verlanget werden, nicht ein einziges Gewehr gefordert worden, sondern noch dazu mit ausdrücklichen Worten stehet: „Nach Abzug derjenigen Stücke, welche in ad 1781 bereits durch den Hauptmann Rabe dahin überbracht worden,“ so ist zu schliessen, daß die in ad 1781 übersandten 260. Stück Gewehre dort überzählig vorhanden seyn müssen, hinfolglich wenn die 137. Stück Gewehre mit eisern Beschlag auch auf keine Weise zu gebrauchen stünden, so kann der daraus entstandene Nachtheil durch diese überzählige 260. Stück völlig abgeholfen werden. 

Braunschweig, den 15ten Mart 1782. [Hauptmann und Zeugmeister] Johann Carl Friedrich Bethge

Citation: Bethge to Riedesel, March 15, 1782, in “Berichte des Oberstleutnants Otto Karl Anton v. Mengen sowie einige Briefe des Generals v Riedesel, des Leutnents Friedrich Karl Reinking and Herzog Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand bzw. das Fürstl. Kriegs- Collegium und darauf ergangege Antwortschreiben des Herzogs Karl, 1781 – 1782,” WO 38b alt Nr. 257, ff. 121, 126, Lower Saxony State Archives Wolfenbüttel.

Images: “Braunschw. Regt v. Riedesel. 1778 in Amerika,” and Braunschw. Regt. v. Specht. 1778,” both in the collection of Friedrich von Germann drawings, New York Public Library Digital Collections.